This paper investigates the effects of managerial ownership on shareholder wealth gains in management buyouts to study whether target managers expropriate public shareholder interests when they buy out a firm. We find that the transaction premiums are negatively associated with the buyout managers’ stock holdings, but not with their option holdings. This evidence indicates that acquiring managers, using their corporate power associated with their stock holdings, pursue their own interests at the expense of public shareholders, and that their interest in the post-buyout firm dominates their interest associated with their options. We also find that the transaction premiums are not associated with the nonbuyout managers’ stock and option holdings.
Keywords: MBO; LBO; going private; managerial ownership; managerial options
학회소식
학회소식
[2011년 제 2차] Corporate Control Through Management Buyouts
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 738
게시일 :
2011-06-03