Title : Do Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation Incentives Imply a Link between Corporate Governance and Firm Value? Theory and Evidence
We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders’ expropriation
incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the
prediction of our model, we find that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with
weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values, but during the postcrisis
recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. Our results
support the view that controlling shareholders’ expropriation incentives imply a link between
corporate governance and firm value.
Keywords: Expropriation; Corporate governance; Firm value; Asian financial crisis; Controlling shareholder; Cash flow rights; Control rights
JEL classification: G15; G21; G32; G33; G34
학회소식
학회소식
[2010년 제 4차] Do Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation Incentiv
작성자 : 관리자
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게시일 :
2010-12-09