Title : Risk Taking of 'Too Big To Fail' Banks : Evidence from Surviving Banks after a Financial Crisis
We argue that optimal lending decision of a bank depends on its expectation of a government bailout and its loan market concentration. Using bank loan information from a country that has experienced a financial crisis and financial sector reform, we show that risk taking of surviving large banks increases as the banking industry becomes more concentrated. These results are robust when controlling for bank financial conditions and other economic conditions. Interactions of market concentration and risk taking of too-big to fail banks explain a recent credit explosion that can lead pose systemic risk in the economy.
Key words: Bank lending, risk taking, financial crisis, bailout, too big to fail
JEL codes: G01, G21, G28
학회소식
학회소식
[2010년 제 4차] Risk Taking of Too Big To Fail Banks
작성자 : 관리자
조회수 : 875
게시일 :
2010-12-09